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WHEN ARECONTRARIANPROFITS DUE TO
STOCK MARKETOVERREACTION?
ABSTRACT
Theprofitability of contrarian investment strategies need not be the resultof stock mar-
ket overreaction. Even if returns on individual securities are temporally independent,
portfolio strategies that attempt to exploit return reversals may still earn positive ex-
pected profits. This is due to the effects of cross-autocovariances fromwhich contrarian
strategies inadvertently benefit. We provide an informal taxonomy of return-generating
processes that yield positive [and negative expected profitsunder a particular contrar-
ian portfolio strategy, and use this taxonomy to reconcile the empirical findings of weak
negative autocorrelation for returns on individual stocks with the strong positive auto-
correlation of portfolio returns. We present empirical evidence against overreaction as
the primary source of contrarian profits, and show the presence of important lead—lag
relations across securities.
AndrewW. Lo A. Craig MacKinlay
Sloan School of Management Department of Finance
M.I.T. Wharton School
50 Memorial Drive University of Pennsylvania
Cambridge, MA 02139 Philadelphia, PA 191041. Introduction.
Since the publication of Louis Bachelier's thesis Theory of Speculation in 1900,
thetheoretical and empirical implications of the random walk hypothesis as a model
for speculative prices have been subjects of intense interest to financial economists.
Although first developed by Bachelier from rudimentary economic considerations of
"fair games," the random walk has received broader support from the many early
empirical studies confirming the unpredictability of stock price changes.1 Of course, it
is by now well-known that the unforecastability of asset returns is neither a necessary
nor a sufficient condition of economic equilibrium.2 And, in viewof recent empirical
evidence, it is also apparent that historical stock market prices do not follow random
walks.3
This fact surprises many economists because the defining property of the random
walk is the uncorrelatedness of its increments, and deviations from this hypothesis nec-
essarily imply forecastable price changes.4 Several recent studies have attributed this
forecastability to what has come to be known as the "stock market overreaction" hy-
pothesis, the notion that investors are subject to waves of optimism and pessimism and
therefore create a kind of "momentum" which causes prices to temporarily swing away
from their fundamental values.5 Although such a hypothesis may be intuitively appeal-
ing, and does yield predictability since what goes down must come up and vice-versa,
a well-articulated equilibrium theory of overreaction with sharp empirical implications
has yet to be developed. But common to virtually all existing "theories" of over-
reaction is one very specific empirical implication: price changes must be negatively
autocorrelated for some holding period.6 Therefore, the extent to which the data are
consistent with stock market overreaction, broadly defined, may be distilled into an
See,forexample, the papers in Cootner (1964), and Fama (1965, 1970).
21n particular, see Leroy (1973) and Lucas (1978).
3See,forexample, Lo and MacKinlay (1988). Our usage of the term "random walk" differs slightly from the classical
definition of a process with independently and identically distributed increments. We are interested primarily in the
unconelatedneu of increment., and not in either independence or identically distributed innovations. Therefore, a process
with uncorrelated but heteroscedastic first-differences would fall into our definition of a random walk; see Lo and MacKinlay
(1988) for theexact statement ofthe random walk hypothesis that we implicitly use here.
4flowever, our surprisemustbe temperedby the observationthat forecasts of stock returns are still subjecttorandom
fluctuations, so that profit opportunities are not immediate consequences of forecastability. Nevertheless, recent studies
maintain the possibility of significant profits, even after controlling for risk in one way or another.
6For example, see DeBondt and Thaler (1985, 1987), Dc Long et. al. (1989), Lehmann (1988), Poterba and Summers
(1988), and Shefrin and Statman (1985).
For example, DeBondt and Thaler (1985) write: "If stock prices systematically overshoot, then their reversal should
be predictable from past return data alone .. ." Otherstudies that consider overreaction also assume this either explicitly
or implicitly.
3.4 —1— 5.89empirically decidable question: are return reversals responsiblefor the predictability
in stock returns?
A more specific consequence of overreaction is the profitabilityof a contrarian
portfolio strategy, a strategy that exploits negativeserial dependence in asset returns
in particular. The defining characteristic of a contrarian strategyis the purchase of
securities that have performed poorly in the past and the sale of securitiesthat have per-
formed well.7 Selling the "winners" and buying the "losers" will earn positive expected
profits because current losers are likely to become futurewinners and current winners
are likely to become future losers when stock returns arenegatively autocorrelated.
Therefore, it may be said that an implication of stock market overreactionis positive
expected profits from a contrarian investment rule. It is the apparent profitability
of several contrarian strategies that has led many to conclude that stock marketsdo
indeed overreact.
In this paper we question the reverse implication that the profitability of contrar-
ian investment strategies is evidence of stock market overreaction. Whereas return
reversals may be sufficient to yield positive expected profits from a contrarian strat-
egy, they are not necessary. Indeed, as an illustrative example weconstruct a simple
return-generating process in which each security's return is temporally independent,
and yet will still yield positive expected profits for a portfolio strategy that buys losers
and sells winners. This seemingly counterlntuitive result is a consequence of positive
cross-cut ocovarsances across securities, from which contrarian portfolio strategies inad-
vertently benefit. For a single security in isolation, negative serial correlation is indeed
necessary and sufficient for the contrarian investor to earn positive expected profits.
However, when there are many securities to choose from the complex cross-effects
among the distinct assets break this link. Therefore, the fact that somecontrarian
strategies have positive expected profits need not imply that stock markets overreact.
In fact, for the particular contrarian strategy we examine, over half of the expected
profits is due to cross-effects and not to negative autocorrelation in individual security
returns.
However, the most striking aspect of our empirical findings is that these cross-
effects are generally positive in sign and have a pronounced lead—lag structure: the
p.rformanc. I. d.fnedand for whatlengthof tim. generates as many different kinds of contrarianstrategiesas
there ar theories of overreaction.
3.4 —2— 5.89returns of large capitalization stocks almost alwayslead those of smaller stocks. This re-
sult, coupled with the observation that individual security returns are generallyweakly
negatively autocorrelated, indicates that the recentlydocumented positive autocorrela-
tion in weekly returns indexes is completely attributable to cross-effects. By exploiting
our contrarian strategy framework, we show thatthese cross-autocorrelations are incon-
sistent with a return-generating process that is the sum of a positivelyautocorrelated
common factor [which generates positive index autocorrelation] plus anidiosyncratic
bid-ask spread process [which yields weak negative serial dependence in individual re-
turns]. Although this is a negative result, it does provides important guidancefor
theoretical models of equilibrium asset prices attempting to explain positive index au-
tocorrelation via time-varying conditional expected returns. Such theories must be
capable of generating lead—lag patterns, since it is the cross-autocorrelationsthat is
the source of positive dependence in stock returns.
Since we focus only on the expected profits of the contrarian investment rule and
not on its risk, our results have implications for stock market efficiency only insofar as
they provide restrictions on economic models that might be consistent [or inconsistent]
with the empirical results. We do not assert or deny the existence of "excessive"
contrarian profits. Such an issue cannot be addressed without specifying an economic
paradigm within which asset prices are rationally determined in equilibrium.8 However,
we have found the contrarian investment strategy to be a convenienttool in exploring
the autocorrelation properties of stock returns. Moreover, our analysis of the nature
of expected profits does point to more specific sources of risk for contrarian strategies
that must be weighed in assessing market efficiency. We leave this more ambitious task
to future research.
In Section 2 we provide a summary of the autocorrelation properties of daily,
weekly and monthly returns, documenting the positive dependence in portfolio returns
and the negative autocorrelations of individual returns. Section 3 presents a formal
analysis of the expected profits from a specific contrarian investment strategyunder
several different return-generating mechanisms, and shows how positive expected profits
need not be related to overreaction. In Section 4 we attempt to empirically quantify
the proportion of contrarian profits that may be attributed to overreaction and find
8Some have accounted for rick in one way or another with mixed result.. For example,Chan (1988)claims that
DeBondt and Thaler's (1985) excess profits are minimal after properly adjusting for risk, whereas Lehmann (1988) uses a
continuous-time argument to conclude that his weekly trading strategy is excessively profitable.
3.4 —3— 5.89that a substantial portion cannot be. We show that a systematic lead—lag relation
among returns of size-sorted portfolios is the primary sourceof contrarian profits and
positive index autocorrelation. In Section 5 we provide some discussion of our useof
weekly returns in contrast to the much longer-horizon returns used in previous studies
of stock market overreaction, and we conclude in Section 6.
2. A Summary of Current Findings.
In Table la we report the first four autocorrelations of weekly equal-weighted and
value-weighted returns indexes for the sample period from 6 July 1962 to 31 December
1987, where the indexes are constructed from the CRSP daily returns files.9 For this
sample period the equal-weighted index has a first-order autocorrelationofapprox-
imately 30 percent. Since its heteroscedasticity-consistent standard error is 0.046, this
autocorrelation is statistically different from zero at all conventional significance lev-
els. The sub-period autocorrelations indicate that this significance is not an artifact of
any particularly influential sub-sample; equal-weighted returns are strongly positively
autocorrelated throughout the sample. Higher order autocorrelations are also posi-
tive although generally smaller in magnitude, and the decay rate is somewhat slower
than the geometric rate of an AR(1) [for example,is 8.8 percent whereas /2 is 11.6
percentj.
To develop a sense of the economic importance of the autocorrelations, recall that
the R2 of a regression of returns on a constant and its first lag is the square of the slope
coefficient which is simply the first-order autocorrelation. Therefore, an autocorrelation
of 30 percent implies that 9 percent of weekly return variation is predictable by using
only the preceding week's returns. In fact, the autocorrelation coefficients implicit in
Lo and MacKinlay's (1988) variance ratios are as high as 49 percent for a sub-sample
of the portfolio of stocks in the smallest size quintile, implying an R2 of about 25
percent. This degree of predictability suggests that a profitable trading strategy might
be to switch from stocks to bonds when this week's predicted index return falls below
the risk-free rate, and vice-versa when it is above. With no transactions costs, the
profitability of such a trading rule may be readily verified.
Unles.statedotherwisewe take returnsto be simple returns and not continuously-compounded. Our conitniction of
weeklyreturns is described in Lo and MacKinlay(1988).
34 _4_. 5.89It may therefore come as some surprise that individual returns are generally weakly
negatively autocorrelated. Table 2a reports the cross-sectional average of autocorrela-
tion coefficients across all stocks that have at least 52 non-missing weekly returns during
the sample period. For the entire cross-section of 4786 such stocks, the average first-
order autocorrelation coefficient, denoted byis —3.4 percent with a cross-sectional
standard deviation of 8.4 percent. Therefore, most of the individual first-order auto-
correlations fall between —20 percent and 13 percent. This implies that most R2's of
regressions of individual security returns on their return last week fall between 0 and
4 percent, considerably less than the predictability of equal-weighted index returns.
Average higher-order autocorrelations are also negative, though smaller in magnitude.
The negativity of autocorrelations may be an indication of stock market overreaction
for individual stocks, but it is also consistent with the existence of a bid-ask spread.
We discuss this further in Section 3.
Table 2a also reports average autocorrelations within size-sorted quintiles.'° The
negative autocorrelations are stronger in the smallest quintile but even the largest
quintile has average autocorrelations less than zero. Compared to the 30 percent auto-
correlation of the equal-weighted index, the magnitudes of the individual autocorrela-
tions indicated by the means [and standard deviations] in Table 2a are generally much
smaller.
For completeness, we also report autocorrelations for returns on daily and monthly
indexes in Tables lb and ic; cross-sectional averages of autocorrelations for daily and
monthly returns on individual stocks are given in Tables 2b and 2c. Similar patterns
are observed: autocorrelations are strongly positive for index returns [35.5 and 14.8
percent p31's for the equal-weighted daily and monthly indexes respectively], and weakly
negative for individual securities [—1.4 and —2.9 percent 3's for daily and monthly
returns respectively].
The general tendency for individual security returns to be negatively serially de-
pendent and for portfolio returns such as those of the equal- and value-weighted market
to be positively autocorrelated raises an intriguing issue. We mentioned earlier that
because the equal-weighted index exhibits strong positive autocorrelation, a profitable
investment strategy would be to allocate assets into equity when equity returns are high
'°AIl eiie-socted portfolio. are conitructed by .orting only once ueing market va1ue of equity at the middle of the
.ample period], hence their compoeition doe. not change over time.
3.4 —5— 5.89and into bonds when equity returns are low. This, however,is at odds with virtually
any contrarian strategysince it involves buying winners and selling losers. And yet
several contrarian strategies have also been shown to yield positiveexpected profits,'1
even though movements in the aggregatestock market do not support overreaction and
the returns of individual stocks are generally only marginally predictable.Is it possible
that contrarian profits are due to something otherthan overreacting investors? We
answer these questions in the next twosections.
3.Analysisof Contrarian Profitability.
To reconcile the profitability of contrarian investment strategieswith the posi-
tive autocorrelation in stock returns indexes, we examine the expected profitsof one
such strategy under various assumptions on the return-generating process.Consider a
collection of N securities and denote by Rt the Nxl—vector of their period treturns
•. . Ry]'.For convenience, we maintain the following assumption throughout this
section:
(Al) R is a jointly covariance-stationary stochastic processwith expectation
E[R] = ••,N1'and autocovariance matrices E[(Rt.....k —
—=r where, with no loss of generality, we take k ￿ 0 since
rk = r'_k.12
In the spirit of virtually all contrarian investment strategies, consider buying stocks at
time t that were "losers" at time t —kand selling stocks at time t that were "winners"
at time t —k,where winning and losing is with respect to the equal-weighted return
on the market. More formally, if w2(k) denotes the fraction of the portfoliodevoted to
security i at time t, let:
"For .xaznpl., D.Bondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) and L.hmann (1988).
t2Auuznption (Al) 1. made for notational simplicity, since joint covariance.stationaxity allows us to eliminate time-
indexes from population moments such as and re; th. qualitative features of our results will not change under the
weaker assumptions of weaklydependest heterogeneouslydistributed vectors R,. This would merely require replacing
expectations with corresponding probability limits of suitably defined time-averages. For the resultsinthissection,the
added generality does not outweigh the expoaltiorial complexity that a weakei set of assumptions requires. However, the
empirical result, of Section 4 are based on these weaker assumptions; interested reader. may refer to conditions (A2)—(A4)
inAppendix 2.
3.4 —6— 5.89w2(k) =—
(Rit_k
—Rmt_k) (3.1)
whereR...k Rjtk/Nis the equally-weighted market index.13 If, for example,
k = 1 then the portfolio strategy in period t is to short the winners and buys the losers
of the previous period, t —1.By construction, t(k)[.i(k) w2t(k) •..wNt(k)]'is
an arbitrage portfolio since the weights sum to zero. Therefore,the total investment
long [or short] at time t is given by It(k) where:
It(k)Iw2t(k)l
. (3.2)
Since the portfolio weights are proportional to the differences between the market
index and the returns, securities that deviate more positively from the market at time
t —kwill have greater negative weight in the time t portfolio, and vice-versa. Such a
strategy is designed to take advantage of stock market overreactions as characterized,
for example, by DeBondt and Thaler (1985): "(1) Extreme movements in stock prices
will be followed by extreme movements in the opposite direction. (2) The more extreme
the initial price movement, the greater will be the subsequent adjustment." The profit
ir(k) from such a strategy is simply:
N
irt(k)=w(k)Rjt . (3.3)
Re-arranging (3.3) and taking expectations yields the following:14
'3Thie is perhaps the simplest portfolio strategy that captures the essence of the contrarian principle. Lehmann (1988)
also consaders this strategy, although he employs a more complicated strategy in his empirical analysis in which the portfolio
weights (3.1) are re-normalised each period by a random factor of proportionality so that the investment is always one
dollar long and short. This portfolio strategy is also similar to that of DeBondt and Thaler (1985 1987) although in
contrast to our us of weekly returns they consider holding periods of three years. See Section 5 for further discussion.
"The relatively straightforward derivation of this equation is included in Appendix 1 for completeness. This is the
population counterpart of Lehmann's (1988) sample moment equation (5) divided by N.
3.4 —7— 5.89E[irt(k)] = ____ —tr(1')
—1 —)2 (34)
where sum = sit/Nand tr(.) denotes the trace operator. The first term
of (3.4) is simply the k-th order autocovariance of the equally-weighted marketindex.
The second term is the cross-sectional average of the k-th order autocovariancesof the
individual securities, and the third term is the cross-sectional variance of the mean
returns. Since this last term is independent of the autocovariances 1'k anddoes not
vary with k, we define the profitability index Lk =L(rk)and the constant a2() as:
____—tr(rk)
1




For purposes that will become evident below we re-write Lk as the following sum:
=[t'rt
—tr(rjj}
—(V1) tr(rk) Ck + °k (3.7)
where:
Ck [t'rkt—tr(rk)J , — (N_i).tr(rk) (3.8)
hence:
E(rt(k)] =Ck+ °k —a2(su). (3.9)
3.4 —8— 5.89Written this way, it is apparent that expected profits may be decomposed into three
terms, one [Ck] depending on only the off-diagonals of the autocovariance matrix rk, the
second [Ok] depending on only the diagonals, and a third [c2(z)] which is independent
of the autocovariances. This allows us to separate the fraction of expected profits due
to the cross-autocovariances Ck, versus the own-autocovariances °k of returns.
From (3.9), it is clear that the profitability of the contrarian strategy (3.1) may
be perfectly consistent with a positively autocorrelated market index and negatively
autocbrrelated individual security returns. Positive cross-autocovariances imply that
the term Ck is positive, and negative autocovariance for individual securities implies
that °k is also positive. Conversely, the empirical finding that equal-weighted indexes
are strongly positively autocorrelated and that individual security returns are weakly
negatively serially dependent implies, through (3.7), that there must be significant
positive cross-autocorrelations across securities. To see this, observe that the first-
order autocorrelation of the equally-weighted index Rmt is simply:




Thenumerator of the second term of the right-hand side of (3.10) is simply the sum
of the first-order autocovariances of individual securities which, if negative, implies
that the first term must be positive in order for the sum to be positive. Therefore,
the positive autocorrelation in weekly returns may be attributed solely to the positive
cross-autocorrelations across securities.
The expression for Lk also suggests that stock market overreaction need not be the
reason that contrarian investment strategies are profitable. To anticipate the examples
below, if returns are positively cross-autocorrelated then a return-reversal strategy
will yield positive profits on average, even if individual security returns are temporally
independent! That is, if a high return for security A today implies that security B's
return will probably be high tomorrow, then a contrarian investment strategy will be
profitable even if each security's returns are unforecastable using past returns of that
security only. The intuition for such a result is straightforward. Suppose there are
only the two stocks, A and B; if A's return is higher than the market today, we sell it
and buy B. But if A and B are positively cross-autocorrelated, a higher return for A
3.4 —9-- 5.89today implies a higher return for B tomorrow [on averages, thus we willhave profited
from our long position in B [on average. Nowhere do we require that the stock market
overreacts, i.e., that individual returns are negatively autocorrelated.Of course, the
presence of stock market overreactions enhancesthe profitability of the return-reversal
strategy, but it is not necessary.
To organize our understanding of the sources and nature of contrarian profits,
we provide four illustrative examples below. They are highly stylized special cases,
nevertheless they yield a useful informal taxonomy of conditions necessary for the
average profitability of the investment strategy (3.1).
3.1. The I.LD. Benchmark.
Let returns Rt be both cross-sectionally and temporally independent. In this case
rk= 0for all non-zero k hence:
Lk=Ck=Ok=O (3.11)
E[irt(k)]=—c2(j)<0. (3.12)
Althoughreturns are both temporally and cross-sectionally unforecastable, the ex-
pected profits are negative as long as there is some cross-sectional variation in expected
returns. This is a result of the fact that our strategy is shorting the higher and buy-
ing the lower mean return securities respectively, a losing proposition even when stock
market prices do follow random walks.15 Since o2(iz) is generally of small magnitude
and does not depend on the autocovariance structure of Rt, we will focus on Lk and
ignore o2(i)forthe remainder of Section 3.
3.2. Stock Market Overreaction and Fads.
Almost any operational definition of stock market overreaction implies that indi-
vidual security returns are negatively autocorrelated over some holding period, so that
'This provides asimpi.count.rexaznpl.toth.somewhatsurprising implication that on. cannot sy,tematicafly lose
moneyin th. stockmarketif price, follow random walks land there ar. no transactions costs). Multiple securities with
distinct mean. imply the exist.nc. of portfolio strategies with positive and negativ, expected returns.
3.4 —10— 5.89"what goes up must come down" and vice-versa. If we denote by (k)the i,j-th
element of the autocovariance matrix rk, the overreaction hypothesis impliesthat the
diagonal elements of rk are negative, i.e., y(k) <0, atleast for k = 1 when the span
of one period corresponds to a complete cycle ofoverreaction.'6 Since the overreaction
hypothesis generally does not restrict the cross-autocovariances,for simplicity we set







The profitability index under these assumptions for R is then:
== (N_l)t(r) = (N_1)(k) > 0(3.14)
where the cross-autocovariance term Ck is zero; the positivity of Lk follows from the
negativity of the own-autocovariances, assuming N > 1. Not surprisingly, if stock
markets do overreact the contrarian investment strategy is profitable on average.
Another price process for which the return-reversal strategy will yield positive
expected profits is the sum of a random walk and an AR(1), which has been recently
proposed as a model of "fads" and "animal spirits."17 Specifically, let the dynamics
for the log-price X1 of each security i be given by:
= Y + Z (3.15)
where
= i + + Lt (3.16)
= pjZj.1 + z.'0 <p < 1 (3.17)
We dicuu thu further in Sectio 5.
'TSee for exarripte,. Summer, (I86).
3.4 —11— 5.89and the disturbances {jt} and {i.'} are temporally, mutually, and cross-sectionally
independent at all positive leads and lags.18 The k-th order autocovariancefor the
return vector R is then given by the following diagonal matrix:
= diag [_iP101N'N ]. (3.18)
The profitability index follows immediately:
= = — (N_i).tr(rk)
N—i.p_1+;tc1 > 0 (3.19)
Since the own-autocovariances in (3.18) are all negative this is a special case of (3.13)
and may therefore be interpreted as an example of stock market overreaction. However,
the fact that returns are negatively autocorrelated at all lags is an artifact of the first-
order autoregressive process and need not be true for the sum of a random walk and a
general stationary process, a model that has been proposed for both stock market fads
and time-varying expected returns.'9 For example, let the "temporary" component of
(3.15) be given by the following stationary AR(2) process:
= z_1— +zij . (3.20)
It is easily verified that the first-difference of Z is positively autocorrelated at lag 1
implying that L1 < 0. Therefore, stock market overreaction necessarily implies the
profitability of the portfolio strategy (3.1) [in the absence of cross-autocorrelation[, but
stock market fads do not.
"This lastassumptionrequires only that e, is independent of c,.+.k for k0. hence the disturbance, may be contem-
poraneously cross-sectionally dependent without loss of generality.
'5For example, see Fazna and French (1988) and Summers (1986).
3.4 —12— 5.893.3. Trading on White Noise and Lead—Lag Relations.
Let the return-generating process for Rt be given by:
R.it= p+ /31At_ + Et ,f3> 0, (3.21)
where At is a temporally independent common factor with zero mean and variance
and the €t'5 are assumed to be both cross-sectionally and temporally independent.
These assumptions imply that for each security i, its returns are white noise with drift]
so that future returns to i are not forecastable from its past returns.This temporal
independence is certainly not consistent with either the spirit or form of thestock
market overreaction hypothesis. And yet it is possible to predict i's returns using past
returns of security j,where5<i. This is obviously an artifact of (3.21) in which the
return on the i-th security depends positively on a lagged common factor, where the
lag is determined by the security's index. This implies that the return of security 1
leads that of securities 2, 3, etc.; the return of security 2 leads that of securities 3,
4, etc.; and so on. Alternatively, observing the return on security 1 todaywill help
forecast the return on security 2 tomorrow, but today's return on security 2 provides
no information for how security 1 will fare tomorrow. This lead—lag relation willinduce
positive expected profits for the contrarian strategy (3.1). To see this, observe that:
o/31/3200 ... ()




0 0 /31/330... 0
0 00 132/34 0
I'2 = •..
(3.23) 0 00 0 13N—313N—1 00 0 0 0 00 0 0 0
3.4 —13— 5.89and, more generally, when k < N then rk has zeros in all entries except alongthe
k-th super-diagonal, for which ji+k = cI3I3+k. For future reference, observe that a
characteristic of the lead—lag model is the asymmetry of the autocovariance matrix rk.
Theprofitability index in this case is:
I3I3+i > 0. (3.24)
From this example the importance of the cross-effects is evident; although each security
is individually unpredictable, a contrarian strategy may still profit if securities are
positively cross-correlated at various leads and lags. Moreover, it should be apparent
that less contrived return-generating processes will also yield posilive expected profits
to contrarian strategies as long as the cross-autocovariances are sufficiently large. One
source of such cross-effects may be non-synchronous trading, as in the models of Scholes
and Williams (1977) and Cohen et. a!. (1986). For example, the non-trading process
proposed by Cohen et. a!. induces the following time series properties in observed
returns when true returns are generated by the market model:20
1. Individual returns are negatively autocorrelated.
2. A market index composed of observed returns to securities with positive betas will
exhibit positive serial dependence.
3. Cross autocorrelations of returns for securities i and jwillbe non-zero, and of the
same sign as f3f3.
Ifsecurities' betas are generally of the same sign, then non-trading induces positive
cross-effects; coupled with the negative individual autocorrelations, this yields positive
expected profits for a contrarian investment strategy. However, Lo and MacKinlay
(1989) show that the magnitudes of cross-effects documented in Section 4 cannot be
completely attributed to non-synchronous trading biases.
2o Chapter 6 of Cohen et. al. (1986).
3.4 —14— 5.893.4. A Positively Dependent Common Factor and the Bid-Ask Spread.
One plausible return-generating mechanism that is consistent with positive index
autocorrelation and negative serial dependence in individual returns is to let each Rj be
the sum of three components: a positively autocorrelated common factor, idiosyncratic
white noise, and a bid-ask spread process.21 More formally, let:
R2 + /3At + rit+ jt (3.25)
where:
EEAt] = 0 EIAtAt+k] y(k)> 0 (3.26)
= E[ti2] 0 Vi,t (3.27)
E[€1tE2t+k] = {or ifk = 0 and i = j. (3.28)
ootherwise.
E[tt+k1 = {— ifk = 1 and i = j. (3.29)
ootherwise.
We have implicitly assumed in (3.29) that Roll's (1984) model of the bid-ask spread
obtains so that the first-order autocorrelation of 17j is the negative of one-fourth the
square of the percentage bid-ask spread s, and all higher-order autocorrelations and
all cross-correlations are zero. Such a return-generating process will yield a positively
autocorrelated market index since averaging the white-noise and bid-ask components
will trivialize them, leaving the common factor At. Yet if the bid-ask spread is large
enough, it may dominate the common factor for each security, yielding negatively
autocorrelated individual security returns.
21Thuis suggtedin Lo andMaKinlay (1988). Conrad, Kaul, and Nimalendran (1988) investigate a similar speciflca-
tion.
3.4 —15— 5.89The autocovariance matrices for (3.25) are given by:
= — diag[s4,..., sq] (3.30)
rk =(k)j33'k> 1 (3.31)
where 13[i3. /2 I3NY• In contrast to the lead—lag model of Section 3.3, the au-
tocovariance matrices for this return-generating process are all symmetric. This yields
an important empirical implication that distinguishes the commonfactor model from
the lead—lag process and will be exploited in our empirical appraisal of overreaction.
Denote by 13mthecross-sectional average Ei/31/N.Then the profitability index
is given by:
L1_pr1)(13i_13m)2 + N1fç (3.32)
Lk
—7A(k)>(i —13m)2k> 1. (3.33)
From (3.32), it is evident that if the bid-ask spreads are large enough and the cross-
sectional variation of the /3k' is small enough, the contrarian strategy (3.1) may yield
positive expected profits when using only one lag [k =1in computing portfolio weights.
However, the positivity of the profitability index is due solely to the negative autocorre-
lations of individual security returns induced by the bid-ask spread. Once this effect is
removed, which is the case when portfolio weights are computed using lags 2 or higher,
relation (3.33) shows that the profitability index is of the opposite sign of the index
autocorrelation coefficient -IA(k); since -y(k) > 0 by assumption, expected profits are
negative for lags higher than 1. In view of our empirical analysis of Section 4 which
shows that Lk is still positive for k > 1, it seems unlikely that the return-generating
process (3.25) can account for the weekly autocorrelation patterns of Lo and MacKinlay
(1988).
3.4 —16— 5.894. An Empirical Appraisal of Overreaction.
To examine the extent to which contrarian profits are due to stock market over-
reaction, we estimate the expected profits from the return-reversal strategyof Sec-
tion 3 for several samples of CRSP NYSE—AMEX securities. Recall that E[irt(k)] =
Ck+ 0k —a2(hz) where Ck depends only on the cross-autocovariances of returns and °k
dependsonly on the own-autocovariances. Table 3a presents estimates of E[7rt(k)], Ck,
°k' and a2(j) for the 551 stocks that have no missing weekly returns duringthe entire
sample period from 6 July 1962 to 31 December 1987. Estimates are computed for
the sample of all stocks and for three size-sorted quintiles. We develop the appropriate
sampling theory in Appendix 2, in which the covariance-stationarity assumption (A2)
is relaxed and replaced with assumptions (A2)—(A4) that allow for weakly dependent
heterogeneously distributed returns.
Consider the last three columns of Table 3a which report the magnitudes of the
three terms Ok, 0k' and a2() as percentages of expected profits. At lag 1 half the
expected profits from the contrarian strategy is due to positive cross-autocovariances.
In the cential quintile about 67 percent of the expected profits is attributable to these
cross-effects. The results at lag 2 are similar; positive cross-autocovariances account
for about 50 percent of the expected profits, 66 percent for the smallest quintile.
The positive expected profits at lags 2 and higher provide direct evidence against
the common component/bid—ask spread model of Section 3.4. If returns contained a
positively autocorrelated common factor and exhibited negative autocorrelation due to
"bid-ask bounce," expected profits can be positive only at lag 1; higher lags must exhibit
negative expected profits as (3.33) shows. Table 3a shows that estimated expected
profits are significantly positive for lags 2 through 4 in all portfolios except one.
The z-statistics for Ck, Ok,andElirt(k)]areasymptotically standard normal under
the null hypothesis that the population values corresponding to the three estimators are
zero. At lag 1 they are almost all significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level.
At higher lags, the own- and cross-autocovariance terms are generally insignificant.
However, estimated expected profits retains its significance even at lag 4, largely due to
the behavior of small stocks. The curious fact that E[irt(k)]isstatistically different from
zero whereas Ck and °k are not suggests that there is important negative correlation
3.4 —17— 5.89between the two estimators Ck and Ok.22 That is, although they areboth noisy
estimates, the variance of their sum is less than each of theirvariances because they
co-vary negatively. Since Ck and Ok areboth functions of second moments and co-
moments, significant correlation of the two estimators impliesthe importance of fourth
co-moments, perhaps as a result of co-skewness or kurtosis. This is beyondthe scope
of our paper, but bears further investigation.
Table 3a also reports the average long [and hence short] positions generated by
the return-reversal strategy over the 1330-week sample period. For all stocks the aver-
age weekly long/short position is $152, corresponding to profitsof $1.69 per week on
average. In contrast, applying the same strategy to a portfolioof small stocks yields
an expected profit of $4.53 per week, but requires only $209 long and short eachweek
on average. The ratio of expected profits to average long investment is 1.1 percent
for all stocks, and 2.2 percent for stocks in the smallest quintile. Of course, in the
absence of market frictions such comparisons are irrelevant since an arbitrage portfolio
strategy may be scaled arbitrarily. However, if the size of one's long/short position is
constrained, as is sometimes the case in practice, then the average investment figures
reported in Table 3a suggest that applying the contrarian strategy to small firms would
be more profitable on average. Alternativel', this may imply that the behavior of small
stocks is the more anomalous from the perspective of the efficient markets hypothesis.23
Using stocks with continuous listing for over twenty years obviously induces a
survivorship bias that is difficult to evaluate. To reduce this bias we perform similar
analyses for two sub-samples: stocks with continuous listing for the first and second
halves of the 1330-week sample respectively. These results are reported in Tables 3b
and 3c. The patterns are virtually identical. In both sub-periods positive cross-effects
account for at least 50 percent of expected profits at lag 1, and generally more at higher
lags.
To develop further intuition for the pattern of these cross-effects we report in
Table 4 cross-autocorrelation matrices 'kforthe vector of returns on the five size-
sorted quintiles and the equal-weighted index using the first sample of 551 stocks.
Specifically, let Zt denote the vector [Rit R2g R3 R4f R5t Rm]' where R.t is the return
We hay. investigated the unlikely possibility that g2()isresponsible for this anomaly; it is not.
Of course we cannot infer from this that themarketfor small capitalization equity is less efficient than the market for
larger stocks sinc, smaller stocks may be more rj,ky. Moreover, no attempt has been made to control for market depth.
Thu. two factors rmght explain the differential in expected profits per dollar long/short between size-sorted portfolios.
3.4 —18— 5.89on the equal-weighted portfolio of stocks in thei-th quintile and Rmtis the return on
the equal-weighted portfolio of all stocks. Then we let Tk D_h/2E[(Zt_k —
—
j)']D'/2where D diag[c,. .. and E[Z]. By this convention, the
i,j-th element of Tk is the correlation of R1t_k with R3. The estimator Tk isthe
usual sample autocorrelation matrix. Note that it is the upper left 5x5 partition of
Tk that corresponds to our definition of rk, since the full matrix Tk alsocontains
autocovariances between portfolio returns and the equal-weighted market index Rmt24
An interesting pattern emerges from Table 4: the entries below the diagonals of
are almost always larger than those above the diagonals [excludingthe last row
and column, which are the autocovariances between portfolio returns and the marketi.
This implies that current returns of smaller stocks are correlated with past returns of
larger stocks, but not vice-versa. This is strong evidence in favor of a distinct lead—lag
relation: the returns of large stocks tend to lead those of small stocks. For example,
the first-order autocorrelation between last week's return on large stocks {R5t_ i] with
this week's return on small stocks [Ru] is 27.6 percent, whereas the first-order autocor-
relation between last week's return on small stocks [Rit_i1 with this week's return on
large stocks [R5t] is only 2.0 percent! Similar patterns may be seen in the higher-order
autocorrelation matrices, although the magnitudes are smaller since the higher-order
cross-autocorrelations decay. The asymmetry of the tk matrices implies that the au-
tocovariance matrix estimators rk are also asymmetric. This provides further evidence
against the return-generating process (3.25) of Section 3.4, since that model implies
symmetric autocovariance matrices.
The results in Tables 3 and 4 point to the complex patterns of cross-effects among
securities as significant sources of positive index autocorrelation as well as expected
profits for contrarian investment rules. Moreover, the presence of these cross-effects has
important implications irrespective of the nature of contrarian profits. For example,
if such profits are genuine, the fact that at least half may be attributed to cross-
autocovariances suggests further investigation of mechanisms by which aggregate shocks
to the economy are transmitted from large capitalization companies to small ones.
34Weincludethe market return in our autocovariance matricee so thatthoee who are interestedmaycompute portfoUo
betasand market volatilities from our tables.
3.4 —19— 5.895. Long Horizons Versus Short Horizons.
Since many recent studies have employed longer-horizon returns in examining con-
trarian strategies and predictability of stock returns, we should provide somediscussion
of our choice to focus exclusively on weekly returns. Because our analysisof the con-
trarian investment strategy (3.1) uses only short-horizon returns, we havelittle to say
about the behavior of long-horizon returns. Distinguishing between shortand long
return horizons is important, as it is now well-known that weekly fluctuationsin stock
returns differ in many ways from movements in three- to five-year returns.There-
fore, inferences concerning the performance of the long-horizon strategiescannot be
drawn directly from short-horizon results such as ours. Nevertheless, some suggestive
comparisons are possible.
Statistically, the predictability f short-horizon returns, especially in weekly and
monthly returns, is stronger and more consistent through time. For example, Blume
and Friend (1978) have estimated a time series of cross-sectional correlation coefficients
of returns in adjacent months using monthly New York Stock Exchange data from 1926
to 1975, and found that for 422 of the 598 months the sample correlation was negative.25
This proportion of negative correlations is considerably higher than expected if returns
are unforecastable. Moreover, in their framework a negative correlation coefficient
implies positive expected profits in our equation (3.4) with k =1.Jegadeesh (1988)
provides further analysis of monthly data and reaches similar conclusions.
The results are even more striking for weekly stock returns. For example, Lo and
MacKinlay (1988) show evidence of strong predictability for portfolio returns using
New York and American Stock Exchange data from 1962 to 1985. Using the same
data, Lehmann (1988) shows that the profits of a contrarian strategy similar to (3.1)
is virtually always profitable. Not surprisingly, such profits are sensitive to the size
of the transactions costs; for some cases a one-way transactions cost of 0.40 percent
is sufficient to render them positive half the time and negative the other half. The
importance of Lehmann's findings obviously hinge on the relevant costs of turning over





whereR, = .Rfl/N,and N, is the number of securities with non-missing returns in months —1and t. Note that p
isproportionalto the profits(3.3)of the contrarian strategy (3.1) [where the factor of proportionality is always negative[.
3.4 —20— 5.89securities frequently, an issue that is not considered in this paper. However, the fact
that our Table 3a shows the smallest firms to be the most profitable on average [as
measured by the ratio of expected profits to the dollar amount long[ may indicate that
0.80 percent roundtrip transactions costs are low. In addition to the bid-ask spread,
which is generally $0.125 or larger and will be a larger percentage of the price for
smaller stocks,26 the price impact of trades on these relatively thinly traded securities
may become important.
Evidence regarding the predictability of long horizon returns is somewhat mixed.
Perhaps the most well-known studies of a contrarian strategy using long horizon returns
are those of DeBondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) in which winners are sold and losers
are purchased, but where the holding period over which "winning" and "losing" is
determined is three years. Based on data from 1926 through 1981 they conclude that
the market overreacts since the losers outperform the winners. However, Chan (1988)
challenges their conclusion and finds that the performance differences can be largely
explained by differences in risk. Moreover, the behavior of DeBondt and Thaler's
(1985) cumulative average residual plots, and the results of Lehmann (1989), suggest
that short-horizon return reversals may be responsible for the long-horizon effect.
Fama and French (1988) and Poterba and Summers (1988) have also examined
the predictability of long horizon returns in a portfolio context, and conclude that
there is negative serial correlation in long horizon returns —aresult which is consistent
with those of DeBondt and Thaler. However, this negative serial dependence is quite
sensitive to the sample period employed and may be largely due to the first ten to twenty
years of the 1926 to 1989 samp1e. Furthermore, the statistical procedure on which
the long-horizon predictability is based has been questioned by Richardson (1988).
Richardson has shown that properly adjusting for the fact that multiple time horizons
[and test statisticsl are considered simultaneously yields serial correlation estimates
that are statistically indistinguishable from zero.
These considerations point convincingly to short-horizon returns as the more im-
mediate source from which evidence of predictability and stock market overreaction-
mightbe culled. Of course, this is not to say that nothing may be gleaned from a
careful investigation of returns over longer time spans. Indeed, it may be only at these
26SmaIler itock. tend to have lower price..
See Kim, Nel.on, and Start. (1988).
3.4 —21— 5.89lower frequencies that the impact ofeconomic factors such as the business cycle is
detectable. Moreover, to the extent thattransaction costs are greater for strategies
exploiting short-horizon predictability,allowing the predictability to persist without
representing any unexploited profit opportunities,long-horizon predictability may be
the more significant issue.
6. Conclusion.
Traditional tests of the random walk hypothesis forstock market prices have gen-
erally focused on either the returns toindividual securities or to portfolios of securities.
In this paper we show that the cross-sectional interactionof security returns over time
is an important aspect of stock price dynamics. As anexample, we document the fact
that stock returns are often positively cross-autocorrelated,which reconciles the nega-
tive serial dependence in individual security returnswith the positive autocorrelation
in market indexes. This also shows that stock marketoverreaction need not be the sole
explanation for the profitability in contrarian portfolio strategies.Indeed, the empirical
evidence suggests that less than 50 percent of the expected profitsfrom a contrarian
investment rule may be attributed to overreaction; the majorityof such profits is due
to the cross-effects among the securities. We have also shownthat these cross-effects
have a very specific pattern for size-sorted portfolios: they display a lead—lagrelation,
with the returns of larger stocks generally leading those of smaller ones.
The tantalizing question remains: What are the economic sources of positive cross-
autocorrelations across securities? One possibility that is consistent with lead—lagbe-
havior is that different sectors of the economy have different sensitivities to macroe-
conomic shocks, sensitivities that may be determined by factors such as the degreeof
vertical and horizontal integration, concentration, market share, etc. Why this should
manifest itself in size-sorted portfolios is still a mystery and remains to be investigated.
3.4 —22— 5.89Appendix 1 —Derivationof (3.4)
N N
irt(k) = = — ,j(Rt_k—R,t_k)R.jt (A1.i)
i=1
N N























—23 5.89Appendix 2 —SamplingTheory for Ok, 0k' and E{7rt(k)1
To derive the sampling theory for theestimators 0k Ok,andEirt(kfl,were-express
them as averages of artificial time seriesand then apply standard asymptotic theory to
those averages. We require the following assumptions:
(A2)For all t, 1, j,andk the following condition is satisfied for finite constants
K> 0, 5 > 0, and r ￿ 0:
< K < 00 . (A2.1)
(A3)The vector of returns Rt is either a-mixing with coefficientsof size 2r/ (r —1)
or4-mixing with coefficients of size 2r/(2r —1).
These assumptions specify the trade-off between dependenceand heterogeneity in R
that is admissible while still permitting some form of thecentral limit theorem to
obtain. The weaker is the moment condition (A2), the quicker the dependencein R
must decay, and vice-versa.28 Observe that the covariance-stationaritYof R is not
required. Denote by C and O the following two time series:
Ckt Rmt_k1rnt — — — (A2.2)
-N-i(t_kt- (A2.3)
where j2andjarethe usual sample means of the returns to security i and the
equally-weighted market index respectively. Then the estimators Ck, Ok,and2(i2)
aregiven by:
21Phillips(1987) and White (1984) for further diecusilon of this trade-off.






= — . (A2.6)
Because we have not assumed covariance-stationarity, the population quantities Ck
and °k obviously need not be interpretable according to (3.8) since the autocovariance
matrix of R may now be time-dependent. However, we do wish to interpret Ck and
as some fixed quantities which are time-independent, thus we require the following:









Although the expectations E[C1andE[Okt] may be time-dependent, assumption
(A4) asserts that their averages converge to well-defined limits, hence the quantities
Ck and °k may be viewed as "average" cross- and own-autocovariance contributions
to expected profits. Consistent estimators of the asymptotic variance of the estimators
Ck and Okmaythen be obtained along the lines of Newey and West (1987), and are
given by ôr and ô respectively, where:
=T-k
{





Ok(0)+ 2a(q)o(i) } (A2.1O)
1 —
q±1'q<T







(O — Ok)(Okt - (A2.12)
t=k+j+1
Assuming that q -o(T1/4),Newey and West (1987) show the consistency of &and
ô under our assumptions (A2)—(A4).29 Observe that these asymptoticvariance esti-
mators are robust to general forms of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelationin the Ckt
and O time series. Since the derivation of heteroscedasticity- and autocorrelation-
consistent standard errors for the estimated expected profits E[irt(k)]isvirtually iden-
tical, we leave this to the reader.
291n our empirical work we choose q =8.
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Averages of autocorrelation coefficientsfor weekly returns on individual securities, for
the period 6 July 1962 to 31 December 1987. Thestatisticis the average of j-th
order autocorrèlatiofl coefficients of returns onindividual stocks that have at least 52
non-missing returns. The population standarddeviation (SD) is given in parentheses.
Since the autocorrelation coefficients are not cross-sectionallyindependent, the reported
standard deviations cannot be used to draw the usual inferences; they arepresented merely


















































Averages of autocorrelation coefficients for daily returns on individual securities, for the
period 3 July 1962 to 31 December 1987. The statisticis the average of j-th order
autocorrelation coefficients of returns on individual stocks that have at least 52 non-missing
weekly returns. The population standard deviation (SD) is given in parentheses. Since the
autocorrelation coefficients are not cross-sectionally independent, the reported standard
deviations cannot be used to draw the usual inferences; they are presented merely as a
















































Averages of autocorrelatiOn coefficientsfor monthly returns on individual securities, for
the period 31 August 1962 to 31 December 1987.The statisticis the average of j-th
order autocorrelation coefficients of returns on individualstocks that have at least 24 non-
missing monthly returns. The populationstandard deviation (SD) is given in parentheses.
Since the autocorrelation coefficients are not cross-sectionallyindependent, the reported
standard deviations cannot be used to draw the usual inferences; they arepresented merely






















































Analysis of the profitability of the return-reversal strategy applied to weekly returns, for the sample of 551 CRSP NYSE—
AMEX stocke with non-missing weekly returns from 6 July 1962 to 31 December 1987 (1330 weeks). Expected profits is gwen
by E(re(k)]= C, + O — c2(M),where Ckdependsonly on cross-autocovariances and O,dependsonly on own-autocovariances.
All s-stat,sticsareasymptotically N(0,1)underthe null hypothesis that the relevant population value is zero, and are robust to
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. The average long position I(k) is also reported, with its sample standard deviation in
parentheses underneath. The analysis is conducted for all stocks as well as for the five size-sorted quintiles; to conserve space,











































































































































































































































Not computed when expected profits are negative.
3.3 11 88Table 3b
Analysis of the profitability of the return-reversal strategyapplied to weekly returns, for the sample of 949 CRSPNYSE—A.MEX
stocks with non-missing weekly returns during the period6 July 1962 to 3 April 1975 (665 weeks). Expected profits is given
byE[irg (k)1= Ct + Ok — a(M),where Ctdependsonly on crossautocovariaflC and Odependsonly on own.autocovariances
All s-statisticS are asymptotically N(O1) under the null hypothesis
that the relevant population value is zero, and are robust to
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. The average long position I(k)isalso reported, with its sample standard deviation ri
parentheses underneath. The analysis is conductedfor all stocks as well as for the five size-sorted quintiles to conserve space,
results for the second and fourth quintiles have been omitted.






























































































































































































































Analysis of theprofitabilityof the return-reversal strategy applied to weekly returns, for the sample of 1172 CRSP NYSE—
AMEX stocks with non-milling weekly returns during the period 4 April 1975 to 31 December 1987 (665 weeks). Expected
profits is given by EIs's(k)]= Ck+ Ok o-2(M),whereC depends only on cross-autocovariances and O& depends only on
own-autocovariance,. All v-statistics are asymptotically N(0,1) under the null hypothesis that the relevant population value
is vero, and are robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. The average long position 16(k) is also reported, with its
sample standard deviation in parentheses underneath. The analysis is conducted for all stocks as well as for the five live-sorted














































































































































































































































Autocorrelatiofl matrices of the vector Z [R1 R2 R3R4 R5 Rmt]' where .R, is the return on the
portfolio of stocks in the i-th quintile,i =1,... , 5and Rmt is the return on the equal-weighted index, for
the sample of 551 stocks with non-missing weeklyreturns from 6 July 1962 to 31 December 1987 (1330
observations). Note T D"2E1(Zt_k —,A)(Zt
—)']D"2,where D diagcr,. ..,o, Asymptotic
standard errors for the autocorrelatiOns under ani.i.d. null hypothesis are given by —= 0.027.
0.919 0.857 0.830 0.747 0.918 R 1.000
1.000 0.943 0.929 0865 0.976
R2 0.919
0.857 0.943 1.000 0.964 0.925 0.979
T0 =R3
R4
R5
Rrr,
0.830
0.747
0.9 18
0.929
0.865
0.976
0.964
0.925
0.979
1.000
0.946
0.974
0.946
1.000
0.933
0.974
0,933
1.000
R1
112
R1
0.333
0.334
112
0.244
0.252
0.265
R3
0.143
0.157
0.175
R4
0.101
0.122
0.140
R5
0.020
0.033
0.051
Rm
0.184
0.195
0.207
T1 —R
R4
R
Rm
0.325
0.316
0.276
0.333
0.262
0.230
0.262
0.177
0.154
0.168
0.139
0.122
0.130
0.050
0.044
0.041
0.204
0.178
0.202
.
R1
112
R
0.130
0.133
112
0.087
0.101
0.088
R3
0.044
0.058
0.046
114
0.022
0.039
0.027
R5
0.005
0.017
0.002
R,,
0.064
0.076
0.061
—
2—113
R4
R
Rm
0.114
0.101
0.067
0.115
0.085
0.055
0.087
0.048
0.020
0.045
0.029 0.008
0.008 —0.012
0.026 0.004
0.059
0.031
0.061
R1
112
R
0.089
0.094
R2
0.047
0.066
0.079
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